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Abstract—Many improvements in the field of wireless com-
munication can be observed nowadays. Some developments
are gradual, others are revolutionary. It is obvious that each
innovation in the area may lead to new security threats and
vulnerabilities. Such technologies and transmission methods
as: Near Field Communication (NFC), Visible Light Commu-
nication (VLC), handover, mesh networks, 5G cellular net-
work, mobile IPv6, beamforming, cooperative beamforming,
Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO), Orthogonal Fre-
quency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA), transmission in
Extra High Frequency (EHF) band are very important from
the security point of view. In order to preserve high level
of security one needs to identify, analyse and classify distinc-
tive sets of threats and vulnerabilities as well as some emerg-
ing data protection opportunities related to innovative wire-
less transmission methods and technologies. This identifica-
tion, analysis and classification is a main purpose of the pa-
per. It will focus on cryptography in wireless systems, security
vs. energy tradeoffs, physical layer security. For example,
common problems related to cryptography may be solved with
a use of physical layer security. Data confidentiality may be
fulfilled with a use of beamforming and jamming, authentica-
tion may be performed with a use of out-of-band authentica-
tion model.
Keywords—authentication, confidentiality, cryptography, threats,
vulnerabilities, wireless transmission.
1. Introduction
1.1. Advances in Wireless Transmission
Wireless, mobile communication systems are commonly
used. Number of applications as well as number of tech-
nologies are growing. An evolutionary improvements may
be observed in such exemplary communication systems
as: cell networks, wireless Local Area Networks (LANs),
wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs). Some new
(often revolutionary) forms/modes of transmission crop up
from time to time. The technology progress is a result of
greater demand for rich media services and rapid growth
of subscriber base.
From the user point of view transmission system should
be eﬀective, reliable and secure. Unfortunately, the main
drawback of wireless transmission is fundamental lack of
data security. There are many intentional as well as non-
intentional threats and many vulnerabilities that should
be evaluated in wireless environment. Numerous security
problems should be solved today, nevertheless pioneering
wireless technologies materialize together with new threats
and vulnerabilities.
The advances in wireless transmission may be described
with a use of three factors:
– universal trends in development,
– constant, evolutionary enhancements in well-
established and commonly used systems,
– new forms, modes, techniques (some of them are rev-
olutionary) of transmission.
1.2. Universal Trends
There are some trends observable in the development of
diﬀerent transmission systems. Obviously, the systems
progress in time: transmission parameters (throughput, de-
lay, bit error rate, jitter) are improving. Better, wireless
communication channel parameters are achieved with ad-
vances in many areas, such as:
– silicon technology,
– keying (modulation) techniques,
– spread spectrum techniques,
– signal processing,
– radio bandwidth expansion,
– adaptive arrays and other types of smart antenna,
– multiple access techniques,
– network topology.
Spectral eﬃciency is growing. Nevertheless it is slowly
reaching theoretical limits. Furthermore, hardware (user
devices as well as infrastructure equipment) costs are con-
stantly decreasing − this is a result of pushing down the
cost of components and leaving the manufacturing to Asian
companies, which are good at making products at high vol-
umes and low costs.
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1.3. Network Convergence
Next important trend is convergence − diﬀerent networks
and services are merging into single network. Wireless
networks management systems are more often based on
cloud computing. User mobility becomes a service which is
supported by upper layers of protocol stacks (e.g. mobility
features in IPv6). It must be noted that all given above
progress trends have signiﬁcant impact on data security.
For example, decreasing cost of hardware is a double-edged
sword. Users get cheaper devices. At the same time cost of
attacks also decreases and new attack methods materialize.
Nowadays, frequently used (and cheap) method of Internet
attack (called phishing) is based on false servers connected
to Internet and used to attract Web users in order to get
their passwords to bank accounts and other conﬁdential
data. Decreasing cost of telecommunication infrastructure
means that it becomes relatively easy to build and attract
users not only to false computer imitating bank server but
also to false communication infrastructure, e.g. false LTE
femtocells. The fake femtocells delivered by impostor may
be used for eavesdropping, denial of service as well as for
spooﬁng purposes.
Another set of security issues is related to convergence.
For example, incorporating IP protocol in LTE systems
means introducing all security threats and vulnerabilities
of Internet to cell phone networks. In the past, voice-
dominated, phone networks have been built on proprietary
interfaces and protocols (e.g. SS7 signalling protocol) also
cell phone networks have been relatively diﬃcult to pen-
etrate, malicious attacks were infrequent in comparison to
Internet. Radio Access Network (RAN) and backhaul had
complex deployment conﬁgurations, speciﬁc to operator,
location and equipment vendor. Attacks on them required
sophisticated preparation and on-site access.
Today, cell phone networks are primarily data networks
based on IP with more open architecture and protocols
(e.g. diameter open signalling protocol). As a consequence
new threats emerge. An example is signalling ﬂood prob-
lem, which may be caused either by malicious activity di-
rected at the cell phone network, or accidentally as an in-
direct eﬀect of upgrades1.
In such converged network single, modern attack on a mo-
bile device may have impact on [1]:
– cell phone subscriber (owner of the device),
– corporate subscriber network,
– mobile core network,
– Internet.
Today, we are living in transitional phase of Internet.
Two versions of Internet Protocol are used side by side:
1In January 2012, NTT DoCoMo in Japan experienced a signalling ﬂood
that disrupted network access, caused by a VoIP OTT application run-
ning on Android phones [http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-
docomo-idUSTRE80Q1YU20120127].
IPv4 and IPv6. IPv4 is old, unprotected, ineﬃcient pro-
tocol with some additional drawbacks as limited address
space and Network Address Translation (NAT) obstacles.
IPv6 is newer, integrated with security tools, more eﬃ-
cient protocol, without address complications, with mo-
bility enhancements. Nevertheless, it must be added that
IPv6 is not a matured technology. There are many issues
related to IPv6 availability, performance and security. Fur-
thermore, there are some problems related to coexistence
of the protocols and to transformation from IPv4 to IPv6
period [2], [3].
1.4. New Transmission Forms, Modes, Techniques
In the last years many innovative technologies utilized in
wireless systems are appeared. First of all new and diverse
bands of electromagnetic waves are incorporated into trans-
mission, e.g.: NFC (13.5 MHz), EHF (30–300 GHz), VLC
(428–750 THz).
Electromagnetic waves are main but not only communi-
cation medium. Transmission systems based on acoustic
energy are also developed2.
Another area of progress is related to space radio coverage.
A lot of research and implementation work is done in such
issues as:
– mesh networking,
– cooperative relaying,
– beamforming and cooperative beamforming,
– IP mobility,
– handover processes.
1.5. Inherent Lack of Security in Wireless Networks
Computer system security is frequently deﬁned (e.g. in ISO
standards) with a use of three general factors: conﬁden-
tiality, integrity and availability (called sometimes CIA).
These requirements incorporate such elementary security
controls as: authentication, authorization, accounting, re-
play protection, Man in the Middle (MiTM) protection,
non-repudiation. The requirements are independent of tech-
nology. They should be fulﬁlled in wired as well as in
wireless transmission systems. Nevertheless, wireless net-
works distinctive features make it is much harder to satisfy
the CIA requirements.
First of all, data conﬁdentiality may be threaten by eaves-
dropping. In ordinary radio communication system eaves-
dropping is much easier since wireless communications
systems have usually broadcast nature − radio signal is
available for everyone in the range of the transmitter. Data
integrity is a function of transmission correctness. Trans-
mission systems based on wireless medium have much
2For example, Microsoft is working on Dhwani Project,
which uses acoustic waves for short range communication
(http://research.microsoft.com/apps/pubs/default.aspx?id=192134).
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higher (up to 107 times greater) nominal bit error rates than
transmission systems based on copper wire or optical ﬁbre
(Table 1).
Table 1
Bit Error Rates
Technology BER (absolute) BER (relative)
Wire
Gigabit Ethernet
10−12 1
Fibre Channel
Wireless
Satellite (GEO) 10−8 104
Satellite (LEO) 10−6 106
Point-to-point 10−5 107
IEEE 802.11 10−6 106
IrDA 10−8 104
An attack on availability of communication services is
called Denial of Service (DoS). There are many meth-
ods used to perform DoS or distributed DoS in computer
networks. Exemplary attacks use some features of com-
munication protocols from higher layers of TCP/IP stack,
such as: Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) or Domain Name Services (DNS).
Such attacks may be executed in all networks without re-
gard to transmission medium. In addition to mentioned
above attacks based on higher layers, DoS in wireless net-
work may be performed at physical layer by jamming radio
channel [4].
Intentionally generating jamming signal is relatively simple
and inexpensive. Furthermore, jamming may also result
from non-intentional reasons. Radio bandwidth (especially
unlicensed part of it) is limited resource. Growing number
of systems using the same unlicensed radio band (especially
2.4–2.5 GHz) leads to increasing interference risk. Unli-
censed ISM (Industry Science Medicine) band is utilized
by such systems and applications as:
– IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi),
– IEEE 802.15.1 (HR WPAN),
– IEEE 802.15.3 (Bluetooth),
– IEEE 802.15.4. (ZigBee),
– HomeRF,
– RFID,
– microwave ovens.
A lot of work is done in search of new, higher and un-
crowded EHF (30–300 GHz) frequency bands (e.g. IEEE
802.11ad already uses 60 GHz). But, it must be noted
that wave propagation at these frequencies is related to en-
tirely diﬀerent set of diﬃculties, e.g. increased free space
path loss. Channel models developed for systems using the
1–3 GHz microwave bands are inadequate to characterize
wireless systems with 10 or even 100 times greater carrier
frequencies. Interference problem is additionally diﬃcult
to solve since signal bandwidth of a single channel is also
much wider than before (see Tables 2 and 3).
Table 2
Signal bandwidth growth in WLAN with IEEE 802.11
IEEE 802.11 version Single channel bandwidth
802.11a 20 MHz
802.11b 22 MHz
802.11n 40 MHz
802.11ac 80 MHz
802.11ac (option) 160 MHz
802.11ad 2 GHz
Table 3
Signal bandwidth growth in cellular phone systems
Cell phone system Single channel bandwidth
Tetra, NMT 25 kHz
GSM 200 kHz
UMTS 5 MHz
LTE 20 MHz
LTE advanced 100 MHz
1.6. Common Security Controls
Some security tools and methods for wireless networks are
used for years. The main of them are:
– hidden channels in Frequency Hopping Spread Spec-
trum (FHSS),
– communication range control methods as sector an-
tenna, transmit power restrictions, diﬀerent forms of
Faraday cages, e.g. shielding paints,
– Medium Access Control (MAC) address ﬁltering,
– data encryption,
– Wireless Intrusion Prevention System (WIPS) and
Network Admission Control (NAC).
2. Cryptography in Wireless Networks
Data encryption is very powerful and widely utilized pro-
tection against eavesdropping. There are many encryption
techniques and protocols used in higher layers of TCP/IP
stack: IPSec, Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security
(SSL/TLS), Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
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(SMIME), Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and so on. Never-
theless, the emergence of large-scale, dynamic and decen-
tralized wireless networks imposes many new challenges
on classical cryptography.
In wireless environment there are some inherent impedi-
ments related to cryptography applications. Data encryp-
tion/decryption is restricted in mobile devices with low pro-
cessor performance and energy limitations. Furthermore,
key management is complex and delicate matter espe-
cially in heterogeneous environment with many diﬀerent
protocols and networks, i.e. IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16,
UMTS, LTE. Cryptography has a negative impact on net-
work throughput. Some protocols devised for wireless net-
works, e.g., Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) proved to be
very vulnerable to cryptanalysis.
An example, of decentralized wireless network is a mesh.
Some speciﬁc challenges related to security are visible
here [9]:
– secure multi-hop routing,
– detection of corrupted nodes,
– denial of service attacks,
– fairness factor of the distribution of network re-
sources.
From the cryptography point of view, an important im-
pediment is links heterogeneity and devices organized into
a mesh. The protection of the communication between non-
neighboring nodes is more complex. It requires the use
of integrity and/or encryption on a higher protocol layer
than the MAC. Furthermore, diﬀerent wireless technolo-
gies such as IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16 used in a mesh
may support diﬀerent algorithms with diﬀerent cryptogra-
phy strength [10].
Even when message conﬁdentiality is provided by stan-
dards with higher level of security like WPA (Wi-Fi Pro-
tected Access) or WPA2, usually only the frame payload
is protected and MAC address in the header of the frame
is transmitted in unencrypted form. So, traﬃc analysis by
frame sniﬃng may be used to monitor and track users in
the network.
Table 4
Exemplary sizes of data ﬁelds in IP packets
Application
Data ﬁeld size
[bytes]
Internet games 40–110
VoIP with LP codec (e.g. G.728) 50–80
Ping 56
World of Worldcraft 74
Skype 84
VoIP with PCM codec (e.g. G.711) 180–260
BitTorrent 377
eMule 1180
Furthermore, complex traﬃc analysis based on entire frame
size may give some hints on application that is used
by a given user. The frame size is related to data ﬁeld,
which contains IP packet − diﬀerent network applications
send packets with diﬀerent number of bytes in data ﬁelds
(Table 4) [5]–[8]. It has been demonstrated that traﬃc
analysis based on IP packet sizes may be used to infer
some information, e.g., the source of a Web page retrieved
by a given user or applications run by the user [11].
3. Physical Layer Security
As an alternative to data encryption in higher TCP/IP lay-
ers the physical layer characteristics of the wireless channel
such as fading or noise may be used to protect conﬁdential-
ity. Beyond securing wireless transmissions of conﬁdential
information, physical layer security solutions have been also
exploited to provide or enhance the authentication and pri-
vacy of legitimate wireless users [12]. There is a lot of
research work in the area of physical layer security. The
main research topics are:
– code design for physical layer security,
– advanced signal processing and space-time secure
transmission techniques, e.g. secure OFDMA sub-
carrier allocation [13],
– secure relaying and cooperative transmission tech-
niques,
– advanced physical layer security attacks, e.g., smart
eavesdropping or jamming, and their countermea-
sures,
– physical layer authentication.
It must be noted that the use of physical layer for data pro-
tection originates from Shannon’s notion of communication
channel information capacity and perfect secrecy.
4. Energy vs. Security
4.1. Energy Gap
Energy available in mobile devices is a limited resource.
Device performance and its internal complexity are rising.
Smartphones, tablets and other mobile devices are equipped
with more and more functions demanding energy. On the
other hand capacity of batteries produced for the devices
is growing but the improvements are very slow. As a re-
sult power gap between energy consumption and battery
lifetime is not decreasing.
The energy gap between energy demands and availability
is widening. The gap has negative impact on data security.
First of all the security tools such as encryption/decryption,
key management, ﬁrewall, antivirus working in mobile de-
vices utilize a lot of energy. Switching on the security tools
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may double the energy used by a given device. Authentica-
tion, Authorization, Accounting (AAA) processes consume
energy, especially in device that changes location and has to
make frequent disassociations and associations with many
access points (APs) or base stations (BS) [14]. Secondly,
device energy may be a resource that is intentionally at-
tacked.
Here we have some examples of an old dilemma − func-
tionality vs. security. Higher security level equals to shorter
battery lifetime.
4.2. Energy Usage by Security Tools
It has been proved that there is no big diﬀerence between
wireless protocols in terms of energy consumption per
crypto operation. The energy consumption related to cryp-
tography is dependent mainly on key length (independently
on the selected algorithm) [15]. Longer battery lifetime
(more functionality) means short cryptographic key, short
cryptographic key means low level of security.
Additional problem is related to user behavior. In order
to increase battery life of the device one has to switch oﬀ
some or all security tools − for a second time, functionality
increases while security decreases.
4.3. Intentional Threats Related to Energy
From energy point of view two forms of intentional threats
and malware may be distinguished:
– common malware utilizing available energy as side
eﬀect,
– dedicated malware for mobile device energy re-
sources in order to exhaust it.
Each common form of attack and malware (e.g. simple port
scanning or ping ﬂooding) utilizes energy of the device that
has been attacked. The device is forced by an attacker to
perform additional tasks like executing code inserted by
intruder or sending data to some unexpected by an owner
of device destinations. If an attack is persistent for a long
time the energy of the device is slowly vanishing. The
experiments [14] demonstrated that port scanning attacks or
ping ﬂooding attacks may double the power consumption
of an exemplary Android based smartphone.
One of the critical categories of attacks is DoS. As a result
of such attack user is unable to use his device, resources
or services. There are many methods for DoS attacks −
they are routinely performed in Internet. The attacks utilize
and drain some resources of attacked system, e.g., memory
for communication buﬀers, processing power, throughput.
In the case of wireless, mobile device DoS attack may be
completed by quickly exhausting the energy of a device.
This may be done by:
– creating unsolicited network traﬃc,
– forcing erratic and CPU consuming behavior,
– utilizing power consuming services, especially GPS
or Bluetooth communication [1].
4.4. New Protection Tools and Methods
Common methods for malware detection and for intrusion
detection systems are: signature based scanning and heuris-
tic scanning. In the wireless and mobile environment a new
technique for malware and attack detection is possible. Anti
malware system may use detailed data on current energy
usage in the device to detect malware or attack. Normal en-
ergy usage proﬁle may be identiﬁed, stored and compared
with recent usage. Deviations from this typical proﬁle may
indicate an infection or an attack.
Another important research area is related to energy sav-
ings. In order to save the device energy consumed by se-
curity tools some changes are necessary. The following
solutions are considered:
– security controls oﬄoading,
– some modiﬁcations to existing malware detection
methods, e.g. based on virtual machines,
– security tools with decreased energy usage.
4.5. Oﬄoaded Security
In order to preserve mobile device energy some tasks of the
device may be moved from the device to another component
of IT system. The security tasks may be oﬄoaded to server
or cloud [16]. The scenario of malware or attack detection
process may look as follows:
– operation (function call, signal) is logged in user mo-
bile device,
– system log is transmitted from the device to server,
– server performs the same operation in simulated user
terminal environment and checks security points,
– result of the checking is transmitted from the server
to the device.
Oﬄoading security controls has some drawbacks. Energy
for data processing (related to security check) in the de-
vice is saved but at the same time extra energy is utilized
for device-server and server-device transmissions. Further-
more, malware detection in server has to be done with a use
of signature-based method, which is vulnerable to some so-
phisticated malware attacks using stealth techniques, poly-
morphism or encrypted code. In order to detect such attacks
signature-based method should be supported by heuristic
detection implemented directly in the device and obviously
draining some energy of the device.
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4.6. Energy Limited Security Tools
Another important research area is designing security tools
with decreased energy usage. This may be done by de-
creased number of control points for malware detection, or
decreased frequency of control checks.
It must be noted that some research teams are working on
more general solutions to energy problem. For example,
researchers from Worcester Polytechnic Institute are work-
ing on analytic 3-dimensional model of relations between
data security and energy consumption. The model takes
into account a given attack countermeasure and the level
of security-reliability it can provide and relationship be-
tween the energy spent in carrying out a countermeasure
and the energy level that is potentially lost if a given attack
is successful [15].
5. Handover vs. Security
Handover is a process for switching wireless network while
mobile device is moving from the range of one access
point (or base station) to the range of another access point
(or base station). Signaling processes may be executed in
many layers. MAC signaling is performed with such proto-
cols as IEEE 802.11i or IEEE 802.11r. IP signaling utilizes
mobile IPv6 options.
Handover processes may be performed while the device is
moving between two access points utilizing the same proto-
col and the same radio band or while the device is changing
access network e.g. from IEEE 802.11 to UMTS. The pro-
cesses are supported by IEEE 802.21 Media-Independent
Handover Services.
Handover processes perform some functions related to se-
curity, like: authentication, key management. For real-time
services handover delays should be kept minimal (at the
level of several tens of milliseconds). Unfortunately, de-
lays are usually much greater, in some cases up to several
seconds.
Solutions to handover delay problems are based on pre-
dictions of awaiting handover and performing some pro-
cesses related to handover in earlier times. Furthermore,
time may be saved by eliminating unnecessary IP handovers
(e.g., when user is roaming among base stations connected
to the same access router) and by combining the mecha-
nisms in the MAC layer with that of the IP layer [17].
An example is Handover Keying (HOKEY) proposed by In-
ternet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Working Group [18].
It is based on modiﬁed Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP), with decreased number of messages sent between
parties. Keys from previous sessions are used in order to
re-authenticate device with next access point. The process
is initiated, while the device is still in the range of former
access point antenna.
Modiﬁed Kerberos authentication for handover is proposed
by Ohba et al. [19] for secure key distribution. Mobile node
obtains master session keys without communicating with
a set of authenticators before handover. Signalling related
to key distribution is based on re-keying. The process is
separated from EAP re-authentication and AAA signalling
similar to initial network access authentication.
6. Secrecy Capacity
6.1. Quantitative Security Measure
Security (conﬁdentiality) level of wireless network may be
measured not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. Se-
crecy capacity is a measure for conﬁdentiality level based
on communication channel information capacity. Channel
information capacity deﬁned as the tightest upper bound on
the rate of information that can be reliably transmitted over
a given communication channel.
Secrecy capacity is deﬁned as diﬀerence between the chan-
nel capacity of the link between sender and legitimate re-
ceiver and the channel capacity of the link between the
same sender and eavesdropper. Value of the parameter is
related to Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) diﬀerence between
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. It must be noted
that some theoretical foundations of wireless security were
presented many years ago, e.g. [20].
So, in order to increase conﬁdentiality level this SNR level
of the communication link between the sender and eaves-
dropper should be decreased. In systems with MIMO and
antenna arrays this may be accomplished by:
– beamforming,
– transmit antenna selection [21],
– sending the jamming signal in the direction of the
eavesdropper.
6.2. Beamforming Solutions
Common beamforming may be used to improve secrecy
capacity. SNR diﬀerence between the legitimate receiver
and the illegitimate receiver may be increased in order to
minimize eavesdropping risk. Beamforming for security
may be used in some diﬀerent modes with assumption that
the location of the eavesdropper is known, or without such
assumption, e.g. [22]–[24].
Common beamforming system uses antenna array inte-
grated with a single node. Cooperative beamforming [25]
is a transmission mode in which in randomly distributed
nodes antenna array is created with antennas from many
nodes. The main purpose of such a system is data trans-
mission on long distances in energy-eﬃcient way.
Cooperative beamforming may be used to increase secrecy
capacity. The protection is based on a subset of intermedi-
ate nodes which adopt distributed beamforming for sending
information to legitimate receiver. At the same time other
nodes send jamming signal to eavesdropper. Both tasks are
accomplished with preserving individual power constraints
of the nodes [26].
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6.3. An Intelligent Jamming
Intelligent jamming is a security strategy aimed at the po-
tential eavesdroppers locations. If the locations of eaves-
dropper and legitimate receiver are diﬀerent then jamming
signal may be directed. Jamming signal is sent (by sec-
tor antenna or by antenna array with beamforming) in the
direction of the area of eavesdropper. At the same time le-
gitimate receiver is not receiving this jamming signal. The
method can eﬀectively raise the noise ﬂoor at eavesdrop-
per position, which makes for him diﬃcult to distinguish
between wireless signals and normal background noise on
the wireless medium.
7. Out-of-Band Authentication
Standard electromagnetic waves communication channel
may not be considered as trusted or authentic. Electro-
magnetic waves may be send from long distances, from
diﬀerent places which may be hidden. In general, user re-
ceiving such signals is not able to determine their source
and may not be assured that a given signal is transmitted by
certain sender. So, reliable procedure for sender authenti-
cation becomes a challenge. Unsecured authentication may
lead to eavesdropping or spooﬁng.
The authentication problem (also cryptographic key for
symmetric algorithms exchange problem) is usually solved
with a use of asymmetric cryptography, e.g. Public Key
Infrastructure and certiﬁcates. Nevertheless, there are some
problems related to cryptography, e.g. the complexity of key
management problem, especially in wireless and hetero-
geneous environment. So, another authentication method
becomes crucial.
Out-of-band authentication is an authentication mode that
uses additional communication channel/method for authen-
tication processes. It is assumed that the system utilizes
common unsecured radio channel (with high bitrate) for
normal data transmission and the second out-of-band chan-
nel with relatively low bitrate, e.g. acoustic channel or vi-
sual channel like IEEE 802.15.7), for authentication pur-
poses only.
The second channel should be authentic: receiver is guar-
anteed that a message he receives actually was send by
a given sender. It is important that human (not the elec-
tronic device) is able to verify the authenticity of the sender
device. The requirement may be satisﬁed in some diﬀerent
ways:
– electric contact,
– NFC,
– relative location check with a use of ultrasound im-
pulses for measurement,
– visual markers photographed with camera smart-
phones, e.g. Seeing is Believing (SiB) method,
– common motion of two devices and accelerometer
data analysis,
– acoustic, e.g. Loud&Clear (L&C) method.
Experiments with the given above methods are carried on.
An exemplary protocol for creating an out-of-band chan-
nel for authentication with visible laser light has been pro-
posed in [27]. The authors assume the laser transmission
is not conﬁdential. An attacker is able to either violate
the conﬁdentiality of data transmitted by VLC or to violate
its authenticity. Proposed protocol, based on oﬀ the shelf
components (so relatively cheap), establishes a secret, au-
thenticated shared key between the personal trusted device
and a remote device.
VLC channel is used also in the method proposed by
Mayrhofer et al. [27]. The devices are equipped with vis-
ible barcodes that encode hashes or public keys. The data
from the barcode of the ﬁrst device are read by taking photo
by the second device. User is aware what is photographed
by the ﬁrst device. The same data are transmitted by radio
channel. Two sets of data received with a use of two dif-
ferent channels are compared in order to authenticate the
second device.
Acoustic channel may be used in a similar way. Authenti-
cation data are played by one device and heard by the other
device.
8. Conclusion
The author have presented several issues related to latest
innovations in wireless communications systems. Each in-
novation is related to new threats and new vulnerabilities.
At the same time the innovations may be used as new op-
portunities for data protection.
There are many protection methods and tools used widely
in wired networks. Many of them are used also in wireless
environment. Nevertheless, one has to be careful transfer-
ring security controls between diﬀerent networks with dif-
ferent devices (including mobile ones). The features like
limited energy, limited processing power and mobile de-
vice memory of wireless networks and mobile devices are
unlike wired networks and immobile devices. So, security
controls should be cautiously chosen and adjusted accord-
ing to the features of this diﬀerent environment.
An important and open, scientiﬁc research area is related
to physical layer security in wireless networks. Upper lay-
ers security controls that are hard to use in mobile envi-
ronment (e.g. cryptography) may be replaced by or used
together with physical layer controls, for example: beam-
forming, dedicated subcarrier allocation in OFDMA, trans-
mit antenna selection, jamming the eavesdropper, authen-
tication with a use of out-of-band communication channel
(e.g. VLC, NFC, SiB, L&C).
A lot of work is to be done in the area related to energy-
security trade-oﬀs. Such issues as models and standards for
these relations, power management methods, oﬀ-loading se-
curity mechanisms from mobile devices are the exemplary
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topics. Research on new security tools and methods with
reduced power consumption is necessary.
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